The Palestinian Forum for Israeli Studies (MADAR) presents the MADAR Strategic Report 2017 Israeli Scene 2016 to political decision- and public opinion-makers.
The MADAR Strategic Report 2017 monitors and analyses key events and developments on the Israeli scene throughout 2016. The report seeks to explore future developments and course of events over the upcoming period, particularly from the perspective of influence on the question of Palestine and its respective dynamics.
The Report investigates the Israeli scene in seven significant areas: Israeli-Palestinian relations; internal Israeli politics; foreign relations; security-military issues; economy; social affairs; and Palestinians of Israel. An Executive Summary provides an overview of major strategic changes, which have impacted Israel and its internal and regional standing. It is hoped that the report sheds light on the Israeli scene, including relevant key influential factors.
A group of specialist researchers and observers of Israeli affairs have participated in compiling and editing the MADAR Strategic Report 2017. Given that the Report coincides with the first centenary of the Balfour Declaration, 70th anniversary of the Partition Plan for Palestine and 50th anniversary of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, MADAR has deemed it fit to include an extensive historiographical and analytical introduction, which traces the constant and the variable within the Zionist Project at a first stage, and across Israel at a later stage. The changes Israel has seen over the past few years are linked to an intersection between the constituent statements of Zionist idea vis-à-vis the social, political and historical changes and their respective impact on the direction of Israel.
In this context, the rise of the New Right and domination of the Israeli scene and its future-oriented actions is part and parcel of these changes. As delineated in previous MADAR reports, the New Right rise significantly reflects the socio-historical transformations which Israel has seen. Israel has gradually turned into a more religious and more conservative society. The Mizrahi Jews have joined the elites, which had been purely Ashkenazi. Following the 1967 occupation, settlers have gained more power on the political map. Israel has also marked a continuing demise of traditional constituent Zionist elites, which were once led
by the Mapai party. These used to rule over Israel until the "revisionist" right wing rose to power in 1977. As explained below, in light of escalating and religionising the settlement enterprise, the rise of the right wing ushered a decline of the revisionist right wing in its Jabotinskyian sense, which is seen in Israel as a representative of the "rational right wing". Comprising descendants of the founders of the revisionist right wing, the so-called lords of the Likud party include Dan Meridor, Benny Begin and Reuven Rivlin. Shulhut, Antoine, "The Israeli New Right: Return to the Facts". In The Israeli Scene, 2 February 2016, The Palestinian Forum for Israeli Studies (MADAR): https://goo.gl/yZIu4Y (in Arabic) (Last accessed, 2 March 2017). In contrast to the fall of this right wing, Israel has witnessed a continuing rise of the "New Right", which consists of ultra-orthodox Haredi parties, national religious parties, settlers, hardliner Knesset members of the Likud party, extremist national groups affiliated with the Yisrael Beiteinu [Israel is Our Home] party, and movements like Im Tirtzu [If You Want], among others. Shulhut, Antoine, op. cit.
A close examination of the rising tides of "New Right" shows its incessant pursuit to dominate the elites, state institutions and course of the state. In the meantime, the New Right emphasises the Jewishness of the state vis-à-vis "democratic values".
With its anti-Palestinian, and more broadly anti-Muslim, ideology and its lauding of the national identity of the Jewish state and power policies, the New Right intersects with the similar racist, anti-Muslim and anti-alien ideology of the new American right wing (which some call the alt-right) Christopher Caldwell,"What the Alt-Right Really Means". 2 December 2016. The New York Times:https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/02/opinion/sunday/what-the-alt-right-really-means.html?_r=2 (Last accessed, 13 March 2017). , which helped Trump come to power. The Israeli New Right is also characterised by glorifying power and by moving away from diplomacy and courtesy. It also identifies with the far-right movements across Europe, where Islamophobia has replaced traditional Semitism.
The temporal overlap between the New Right in Israel and the far-right wing in Europe impacts Israel's policies towards the Palestinians and the prospects of ending the occupation. It allows room for Israel to circumvent any attempts or pressure to end the occupation. It furnishes an opportunity for a political manoeuvre and for imposing facts on the ground, making the establishment of a viable Palestinian state an impossible task. As indicated by the chapter on
"Foreign Relations" of this report, the Israeli government exploits bloody conflicts across the Arab world, civil war in Syria and Iraq and rise of radical movements which employ religion in their ideologies to promote its evasion from putting an end to the occupation. By these, Israel claims that the conflict with the Palestinians is a cultural and civic confrontation between two civilised and uncivilised worlds. As he stated on many occasions, Netanyahu has alleged that the question of Palestine is nothing but a pretext used to confront Israel. This is why Israel hastened to accuse the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) of operations carried out by the Palestinians in 2016. For example, Israel accused Ya'qoub Abu al-Qi'an of affiliating with ISIS only minutes after the Israeli Police had killed him. Along this vein, Israel, Europe and America are united in one trench against a single terrorist force. Today, Israel and the New Right led by Netanyahu share common visions with Trump and the new right-right movement in America. However, it is this intersection which consolidates the image of Israel as a racist occupying state, which stands in the same spot and side by side with the new racist and fascist right wing. This haunts Israel, which views seclusion and boycott as a risk of delegitimisation. Israel looks at fighting isolation and exclusion as an essential component of its perspective of national security. Led by Netanyahu, the New Right's rule is reflected in three primary components, which Netanyahu seeks to steer in line with Israel's political concepts:
1. Position towards the occupation/settlement enterprise: 2016 marked relentless attempts to bolster the status of settlers and settlements within the official consensus. These attempts were not confined to conventional tools, which used to be dominated by the state and state institutions. Under various pretexts, Israel has continued to confiscate and seize Palestinian land. Thanks to the Law on Legalising Settlements, Palestinian land grabbed by Israeli individuals can now be retroactively whitewashed. This means that the state shares "tools of violence" and sovereignty together with settlers. Israel has turned into a tool to whitewash settler violation of its own laws. This is a proof of the power settlers enjoy in setting the direction of the state. International rejection and reactions to enacting the Israeli Law on Legalising Settlements was one reason the USA refrained from using the veto against the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334. However, Trump's victory has alleviated international pressure on Israel. Even before he own the election, Trump attempted to disrupt Resolution 2334 and urged Egypt to withdraw the draft resolution. The Israeli right wing also exploited Trump's rise to power to demand that Netanyahu completely abandon the two-state solution, which he had admitted in what has come to be known as the Bar Ilan Speech. Israel's right wing also call on Netanyahu to annex Area C. Nonetheless, Netanyahu has declined to do so. His statements indicate that he seeks to manage the occupation file in full coordination with the Trump Administration. To avoid any potential crisis, Netanyahu would not take any surprising steps, but would toss the ball into the Palestinian court.
2. Relationship with the Palestinians of Israel: In 2016, the Netanyahu government continued to deal with the Palestinians of Israel as if they were a source of security or demographic danger. This attitude was reflected in the ongoing ban of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, incitement against Arab Knesset members, extension of laws targeting the Palestinians of Israel (e.g. the law on family reunion), and enactment of racist laws. In addition, 2016 marked extensive home demolitions, particularly in the Naqab (Negev) area. The attempts made to demolish the Umm al-Hiran village are part and parcel of Israel's policy of Judaising the Naqab (Negev). Israel intends to construct the planned, purely Jewish village of Hiran on the ruins of Umm al-Hiran.
3. Structure of the state and inclination to a more Jewish and a less democratic Israel: Israel defines itself as a Jewish and democratic state. Preserving a balance between the democratic and Jewish components is one goal which Israel claims it seeks to maintain. As explained below, the continuing rise of the New Right has facilitated a populist culture, which aims to consolidate the Jewish national structure of the state and attempts to control the elites. The latter have shifted from secular, labour Ashkenazi elites to settler, religious right wing Mizrahi ones, which currently dominate the Zionist Project and try to resolve the conflict with the Palestinians by annexing Area C, deciding the future of the Golan Heights, and maintain the political status quo of the Palestinian Authority as if it were the final solution.
The following sections provide a detailed review of the constant and variable factors within the Zionist Project. In addition to tracking primary structures and constituent statements, an attempt is made to investigate transformations that affected Israel since the Balfour Declaration up to the fourth Netanyahu government.
Israel between the Colony and the State
The Constant and the Variable 100 Years of the Balfour Declaration, 70 Years of Partition and 50 Years of Occupation
This year marks three occasions linked to the Zionist project at a first stage, and to Israel at a later stage. Each occasion has turned history of the region upside down and reshaped the local and regional scene. The profound consequences of these events have extended to impact the international system as a whole. The region has continued to witness ongoing repercussions and interactions of these events. With an oscillating echo from one year to another, these occasions mark the completion of another decade of anniversaries. These are (1) the first centenary of the Balfour Declaration, (2) the 70th anniversary of the Partition Plan for Palestine, and (3) the 50th anniversary of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These paradigmatic historical milestones reflect, to a great extent, the structural and strategic overlap as well as deep-rooted interconnectedness between the local, the regional and the international in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
The Land, Immigration and Jewish Sovereignty
The Balfour Declaration (a promise from those who do not own to those who do not deserve) was the first international document, which enshrined a "Jewish right" to a "national homeland" on the land of Palestine. This promise was later embraced and upheld at the San Remo Conference of 1922. Accordingly, Palestine was destined to be part of the British Mandate, which was later approved by the League of Nations in 1922. The Balfour Declaration provided a "legal" cover to materialise the Zionist Project on the land of Palestine. The Zionist Project has relied on three central, irreducible and irreplaceable foundations on the path to achieving sovereign Jewish statehood:
1. Jewish immigration to Palestine (population);
2. Facilitating control over land (territory); and
3. Establishing Jewish institutions (Yishuv) that would provide the hub of the upcoming Jewish sovereign state (sovereignty).
Together, these three components provided the essential pillars for realising the Zionist Project on the land of Palestine. Immigration provided the ground for creating a new demographic reality. Land gave the space needed to found the Jewish colony. Private Jewish institutions paved the way to creating the structure of the prospective state. In addition to political and ideological agencies (education, theatre and journalism), state institutions included the apparatus of violence, including the military establishment and intelligence community. These structures were later utilised to expel Palestinians from their own country and furnish an opportunity to create a new demographic, sovereign status, based on a decisive sovereign and Jewish majority. From its onset, this has been the constant norm of the Zionist Project.
The Balfour Declaration laid down the first international foundation for establishing a Jewish national entity in Palestine and provided an international cover for the colonisation of Palestine. By contrast, the Partition Plan for Palestine gave an international cover to convert the Zionist colony into a national, political entity of a clearly demarcated Jewish state in Palestine. This state was created over 45 percent of the territory, where Arabs comprised more than two thirds of the population. Enforcement of the Partition Plan soon culminated in the Nakba [catastrophe] of the Palestinian people. Over 90 percent of the Palestinian population were displaced from the territory, on which the Jewish state had been established. Contrary to the Partition Plan itself, the Jewish state stretched over 78 percent of the land of Palestine. Then, expulsion and displacement of Palestinians were not just a transient event in the transition from the colony to the "state". See Azoulay, Ariella (2009). "Constituent violence 1947–1950: A visual genealogy of a regime and the transformation of the catastrophe into ‘a catastrophe from their point of view', Resling (in Hebrew), 1-14. On one end, the Jewish Yishuv institutions were part and parcel of the "constituent violence" Benjamin, Walter (1986). Reflections: Essays, aphorisms, autobiographical writings. Tran. Edmund Jepchott, New York: Schocken Books. 277-300. which preceded realisation of the Jewish state with a sovereign Jewish majority. On the other, the regime of governance and laws, which were enacted following the declaration of independence provided the tools needed to maintain the structure of the sovereign Jewish state that was established in 1948. In particular, these tools included the Law of "Return", prevention of the return of Palestinian refugees and placing Palestinians of the 1948 territory under military rule.
Twenty years after the Partition Plan, the Palestinian Nakba and establishment of the "Jewish state", the 1967 war with the neighbouring countries proved that Israel had become a pivotal power in the region. Paradoxically, the 1967 war contributed to a gradual transformation of Israel from the "colony" to the "occupying state". On the other hand, the 1967 war consolidated the Arab and Islamic dimension of the conflict. Following the Naksa [Arab defeat in the 1967 war], the conflict has gradually shifted from the question of liberating Palestine and restoring Palestinian rights to the demand that Israel withdraw from the Palestinian and Arab territories occupied in 1967 a process which would end with the establishment of the independent Palestinian state on the 1967 border. By contrast, the occupation turned into a main factor that reshaped the Israeli political map. It has had a structural impact on the domestic identity of the Israeli society. The occupation has strengthened the messianic, biblical dimension of the conflict. In this context, it is worth noting that the springboard for religionising the conflict is substantially linked to Zionism, which generally employed the religious heritage to advocate for a Jewish right to Palestine. In particular, since early 1950s, David Ben-Gurion played a pivotal role in transforming the biblical heritage into an ingredient part of the Jewish identity of the state. Also known as the "civil religion" of the state, this transformation integrates religion and religious rituals and feasts into the secular, national identity of the political regime. Along this vein, reference is made to the statement David Ben-Gurion made in the aftermath of occupying large swathes of the Sinai Peninsula: "The Third Kingdom of Israel has risen today." By the end of the 1956 Tripartite Aggression and occupation of the Sinai Peninsula, Ben-Gurion stated: "We will be able once again to sing the psalms. You have marked a successful completion of a military operation that is the greatest and most proud in the history of our people. It is one of the most amazing operations in the history of peoples. Once again, we can sing the song of Moses and the people of Ancient Israel: ‘The nations will hear and tremble; anguish will grip the people of Philistia. The chiefs of Edom will be terrified, the leaders of Moab will be seized with trembling, the people of Canaan will melt away; terror and dread will fall on them'." Eilat will be restored once again; the main Hebrew port in the south. So will Yotvat (also called Tiran) return to be an integral part of the Third Kingdom of Israel. See Shaham, David (1991). Israel: 40 Years. Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 138 (in Hebrew). Ben-Gurion considered that Sinai was part of the ancient Kingdom of Israel. This has constituted the pre-made secular formula of the messianic discourse of Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel), which the right wing settler camp embraced in the aftermath of the Naksa. Ohana, David (2009). "Secular Messianism as a political theology: The case of David Ben-Gurion". In Schmidt, Christoph. God will not stand still: Jewish modernity and political theology. Jerusalem: The Van Leer Jerusalem Institute and Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 204-225.
In 1967, Israel occupied a territory that was three times its area. Then, Israel launched a strategic settlement enterprise to redraw the geo-demographic map. Settlement activity was not only restricted to the Palestinian territory, but was also extended to settlement construction in the Sinai Peninsula. Based on the Camp David Agreement, Israel dismantled settlements in Sinai after it had already ensured that Egypt's would keep apart from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel also started settlement construction in the Golan Heights as a prelude to annexation to Israel proper. Settlement activity was promoted by enacting the Golan Law of 1981, according to which the Israeli law and jurisdiction has been enforced to the Golan Heights. Earlier, Israel had already annexed East Jerusalem to the municipal borders of the Jerusalem Municipality. Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, The Knesset: In 1980, Israel passed the Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel. In June 1967, after the war has ended, Israel annexed East Jerusalem, which under the Jordanian Rule comprised 6,000 dunums as well as 70,000 dunums of land in the surrounding areas, including almost 29 villages. This area was annexed to the Jerusalem Municipality borders and placed under Israel's government and jurisdiction. According to the 1952 Law on the Entry of Aliens, Palestinian inhabitants of East Jerusalem were given the status of permanent residents. For more information, see Ghanim, Honaida, "Transformation of Jerusalem into Urshalim: On the Policies of Erasure, Replacement and Resistance", Siyasat, 33, 30-44. The annexation of Jerusalem further strengthened the Islamic dimension of the conflict in view of the holy status of the city. Meantime, Israeli maintained a military administration of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, the motive that guided the relationship with the occupied territory after 1967 has been the same driving force of the Zionist Project since its onset: the construction of sovereign Jewish colonies on the land. This time, however, colonies were an extension of the state, rather than a component that pre-existed statehood. This ensured a transformation in Israeli social and political structures. The right wing, messianic and settler vanguard replaced the secular, labour and Ashkenazi vanguard. Hoisting the banner of the Yishuv enterprise, the Ashkenazi vanguard led the state in its first and second decades. At the time, the demographic context in the occupied territory was similar to the demographic reality during the Yishuv era, namely the existence of an overwhelming Palestinian majority in the occupied space. Consequently, the state was forced to devise tools of outstanding administrative control, which would assimilate the idea of the settlement. At the same time, however, this idea would not transform Israel into a bi-national state. Bear in mind that a Jewish majority is an established Zionist prerequisite to realise the Jewish national project.
The Occupied Population in the Non-occupied Territory!
Israel's relationship with the Palestinian territory has crystallised and taken shape on complex legal, political and civil levels. Principally, the Israeli relationship relied on practical and legal discrimination between the land and the population. Israel considered that the land was not occupied, rather it was "disputed". It viewed Palestinians as an occupied population, the majority of whom were given the status of subjects. The population of Jerusalem and Golan Heights were given a status that was intermediate between subjects and citizens; namely permanent residents.
Discrimination was justified by the colonial principles of the Zionist Project, in which control over land was the constant element. The population was seen as a problem that should be dealt with. See Wolfe, Patrick (2006). "Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native", Journal of Genocide Research, 8(4), 387–409
The Israeli legal claim relied on the premise that the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which were occupied, were not as such. Even though it controlled this territory by war, On the legal interpretation of the status of the occupied territory, see Decision 393/82 of the High Court of Justice, in which Justice Aharon Barack used the term "תפיסה לוחמתית" (Belligerent Occupation). Israel posited that it seized the West Bank and Gaza Strip from a sovereign regime that was originally illegitimate. For example, the Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank and East Jerusalem was illegal. Israel indicated that annexing this territory to Jordan was only recognised by two states, namely Pakistan and Britain. Based on this claim and to avoid the problem arising from the applicability of international conventions, particularly the Fourth Geneva Convention, to the occupied territory, Israel invented a new concept to deal with the occupied territory: "Administrative application" of international conventions and treaties. This means that international conventions concerning the occupied territory are applicable, but the territory is not recognised as occupied! Although Israel's legal interpretation is significant, the distinction between the territory and population and the statement that the Palestinian territory is not occupied are associated with ideological references and governed by a partisan perspective, which is linked more to the concept of national security. This issue reflects paradigmatic shifts and ideological transformations effected by the occupation on the internal scene.
Ideological Transformations
1. The Likud party: In its position of rejecting the fact that the Palestinian territory was occupied, the liberal right wing, which is perceived as associated to the Likud party in particular, Goodman, Micah (2017). The 1967 trap: The ideas behind the split that is tearing Israel apart. Or Yehuda: Kinneret Zmora-Bitan Dvir, 17-20. relied on "international legitimacy", rather than on the religious heritage adopted by the national, right wing and settler movement. From the classic Likud perspective, this position was informed by the Balfour Declaration and later by the San Remo Resolution which gave the Mandate for Palestine to the British Government. The Mandate for Palestine also included clear clauses, providing for creating the conditions for establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. The Mandate did not mention the rights of the Palestinian people. These were the international underpinnings of the Israeli liberal right wing. Defenders of this right wing view include Professor Talia Einhorn, who bases her position on the San Remo Conference of 1920. The Conference resolved that Palestine would be under the British Mandate. According to the Preamble of the Mandate for Palestine document, the Mandate is based on the international recognition of the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine. Article 2 of the Mandate provides that "[t]he Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions and will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home." However, the Mandate turned a blind eye on any Palestinian rights. For more information, see The Ariel Research Centre (undated). "Israel and International Law". NEWS!: http://www.news1.co.il/Archive/003-D-2708-00.html (Last accessed, 2 March 2017). However, this revisionist approach has altered in favour of the messianic religious position in view of the changing elites of the liberal right wing, or so-called lord of the Likud, and rise of the New Right.
2. Religious Zionism: As many researchers indicate, the religious Zionist movement has not always been a right wing movement. Zionism transformed into that movement in contrast to the shift of the Likud elites from the liberal right wing to the New Right as a direct consequence of the 1967 war. Goodman, Micah, op. cit. 32 and 67. Victory in this war was perceived as a divine miracle, which brought the Jews back to the Biblical Land. It transformed Rabbi Cook, the spiritual father of the right wing settler movement, to the central track in religious Zionism. On the eve of the occupation, religious Zionism was a marginal movement of the national right wing. Religious Zionism is different from the central movement of the National Religious Party (Mafdal), which was led by Yosef Burg.
3. Mapai (Labour) party: The Labour party derived its position towards the Palestinian territory from strategic-security and demographic considerations. These considerations were reflected in the Allon Plan, which proposed the areas to be annexed and those to be withdrawn from in a future agreement. The Labour party, under the reign of which occupation took place, did not hoist the banner of peace with the Palestinians nor did it take them into account. On the contrary, the Labour party rejected the Palestinian existence and maintained this approach until the Camp David Agreement was concluded. Then, the party showed a gradual transformation, which culminated in the Oslo Agreement. Accordingly, Israel withdrew from densely populated areas of the West Bank and the Palestinian Authority was established. In the domestic Israeli discourse, the Labour party became to be described as a "left-wing" party to some extent.
Overtime, particularly with the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987, which also marks the 30th anniversary this year, Palestinians emerged as a security issue. The debate over the future of the occupied territory and respective Israeli policies transformed into an essential product of the heated internal Israeli political conflict. It also turned into an influential factor in Israel's foreign relations and international status. This debate reached a climax with the conclusion of the Oslo Accords. The Oslo process resulted in sharp political schisms, which led to the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and to a steady, progressive rise of the New Right. The New Right has been in power over the ensuing period, with the exception of only two and a half year in which the Ehud Barak was prime minister. The Barak government was concluded with a fatal bullet to the political process. It led to the outburst of statements, including Barak's own claim that Israel had no Palestinian partner in the peace process. Then, the right wing has come to and remained in power. Ever since, the Israeli political scene has been shared by the New Right led by Netanyahu, an official, revisionist right wing represented by Ariel Sharon, who had established the Kadima party, and Ehud Barack. Since 2009, the Israeli government has settled with the New Right of Netanyahu, who is now prime minister of his fourth government. On the composition of various Israeli governments since 1948, see "Governments of Israel", The Knesset: https://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/eng/GovtByMinistry_eng.asp (Last accessed, 11 March 2017).
The right wing political scene, which currently dominates state institutions, is immersed in a messianic, biblical discourse, which is not only embraced by religious movements such as HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home) party. This discourse is also adopted by the Likud, Kulanu (All of Us), and to some extent by Yesh Atid (There is a Future) and Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Our Home). The latter take on a secularised political, religious theology, which was effectively developed by Ben-Gurion. Politically, these parties share the belief that the territory of the West Bank and East Jerusalem are essentially part of Eretz Yisrael and the historical national home. Any waiver of parts of this land is an "exorbitant price" for peace, which Netanyahu, Lapid and Lieberman claim that they want, but is categorically rejected by Naftali Bennett, the representative of the national settler right wing movement.
Internally, the right wing have disagreed about the price Israel might, or might not, pay to achieve peace. Still, the current Netanyahu government a religious, setter right wing government enjoys much room for manoeuvre to expand and consolidate settlement activity. Thanks to a Palestinian Authority that manages affairs of the Palestinian population, the Netanyahu government relies on a prevalent distinction between the land and the population. The Israeli government employs this status quo to exploit and dispose of Palestinian natural resources, as it is the case in Dead Sea, Jordan Valley and East Jerusalem. Al-Haq (2012). Pillage of the Dead Sea: Israel's unlawful exploitation of natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory, Ramallah: AL-Haq.
The position towards the land (rather than the population) has turned into the an assembly line of the political partisan arc. On the extreme left of this arc lie movements or parties, such as Meretz, which opposes the occupation and considers that the land controlled by Israel after 1967 is occupied territory, not disputed land. On the right side of the arc lies the Labour party, which saw successive compositions and changing positions towards the settlement enterprise. The Labour party expresses its willingness to reach a political solution based on the two-state solution, but stipulates that settlement blocs be maintained and rejects the right of return. It is worth noting that the settlement enterprise was initiated under the Labour party-led government, which established the settlement geography in line with security-colonial considerations. These were grounded in the Yigal Allon Plan, which was presented in summer 1967 to the Levy Eshkol government. Although it was not officially adopted, the Allon Plan has been the reference point of settlement schemes. According to this Plan, settlements have been constructed into blocs along the Green Line and in the Jordan Valley and Gosh Etzion. On the right side of the Labour party, the Yesh Atid (There is a Future) party claims that it consents to the two-state solution, but refuses to withdraw from Jerusalem, strikes a sympathetic chord with
