The war on the Gaza Strip had repercussions on Israeli relations with regional and international countries, such as Russia, China, Turkey and others. What was striking, however, was the repercussions on Israel's relations with both Russia and Turkey. Therefore, the current paper will focus on the repercussions of the war and its impact on relations with these two countries, and its future after the war. The central question that the paper will try to answer is : Will the war bring about far-reaching fundamental changes in Israel's relationship with both Turkey and Russia? Or will the war-affected relations be emergency and return to their pre-war status?
Relations with Russia and Turkey before the war
Turkish-Israeli relations before the war witnessed a major diplomatic breakthrough between the two countries, represented in what looks like reconciliation and the restoration of relations to normal and the reappointment of S Furra, and the Turkish-Israeli rapprochement began years ago, and full diplomatic relations between the two countries returned during the Bennett-Lapid government, and Turkey continued to maintain its relationship with Israel during the period of the B. [i] Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Netanyahu met on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly last September. Israel considered that Turkey's interest with Israel is no longer as inherent in tension between the two countries as it once was.[ii]
As for relations with Russia, Israel has maintained them by continuing to take a relatively neutral stance on the war in Ukraine, unlike Western countries led by the United States, which have supported Ukraine economically, militarily and politically. Israel refrained from condemning Russia's military actions in Ukraine, as well as refraining from Impose any economic sanctions on it. Israel's interest in the relationship with Russia, particularly in maintaining security understandings between them over Israeli attacks on Iranian bases in Syria, was an Israeli priority over taking a pro-American stance against Russia. It also shows Israel's interest with Russia in making the latter compatible with the international position rejecting the military development of the Iranian nuclear project.
However, Israeli concern about the Russian-Iranian rapprochement has increased in the last year in the wake of Iran's military support for Russia in its war on Ukraine, especially in the drone sector, where there is Israeli concern that the Iranian-Russian rapprochement may lead to deepening cooperation between the two countries in the military field, developing Iranian capabilities, or providing Iran with advanced Russian defense systems that hinder Israel from carrying out future attacks on the Iranian nuclear project.[iii]
Post-war relations
Relations between Israel and Russia and Turkey deteriorated after the war on Gaza. The two countries did not consider Hamas a terrorist movement, and a Hamas delegation headed by Musa Abu Marzouq visited Russia on October 27 and met with representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Erdogan also said Hamas was not a terrorist movement, accusing Israel of war crimes, as well as the presence of Hamas leaders in Turkey.
The two countries also share attacks on the West, with Putin repeatedly stating that the West, led by the United States, has failed to stop the war and is even working to expand it, while Erdogan has stated that unlimited and conditional Western support for Israel turns the conflict into a conflict between East and West. Erdogan has repeatedly attacked Western countries for their support for Israel and their disregard for targeting the civilian population in the Strip.
As for Russia, it took it nine days to express its rejection of the events of the seventh of last October, during a call Putin had with Netanyahu, and this was the first conversation between them since Netanyahu returned to the premiership, unlike previous periods characterized by the proximity of the two men and their continuous conversation. Russia considered the events to be due to the failure of the United States to achieve the two-state solution, and Israeli practices, and Putin compared the siege of Gaza to the siege of the city of Leningrad by Nazi forces during World War II, which in Russian memory is considered a humanitarian catastrophe.[iv] Russian media and social networks in Russia have adopted a hostile stance toward Israel, and the attack on Israeli passengers at Dagestan airport on October 29 was seen as an expression of Russia's general anti-Israel atmosphere during the war.[v]
Russia submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council on October 16 for a ceasefire , without referring to a direct condemnation of Hamas, but rather condemned the principle of harming civilians, and on October 29 Russia vetoed the US resolution in support of Israel and its right to self-defense.
The Russian position prompted the emergence of a trend in Israel demanding a rethinking of the relationship with Russia and changing the Israeli position on the war on Ukraine so that Israel is part of the Western camp headed by the United States that supports Ukraine militarily and economically.[vi]This approach considers that American and Western support for Israel during the war requires Israel to change its position on Russia, in addition to that Western countries will demand that Israel after the war stand with it against Russia as it did during its war in the Gaza Strip. Ze'ev Elkin, a member of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee , noted that Russia is now considered an enemy state to Israel, and the latter should act similarly with it.[vii]
Israeli sources analyze the Russian position that there is an interest for Russia in the war on Gaza to transfer the spotlight and international attention from the war in Ukraine to the Middle East crisis, as well as that there are news that the weapons that were going to Ukraine instead went to Israel, and showing the United States as the cause of the crises and the continuation of the war in Gaza as is the case in the continuation of the war in Ukraine, and Russia believes that Israel, because of Western support for it, turned into Part of this camp, as Russia's war is against the United States, and standing against Israel is like standing against the United States, in addition to Russia's interest in playing a regional role through its influence and relations with its allies in the region, and it is not in Russia's interest to expand the war in the region, which may harm Syria and Iran, which it considers its allies, especially Iran, which strengthened its relationship with it in the wake of the war in Ukraine.[viii]
As for Turkey, Erdogan's repeated rhetoric demanding that Israel be held accountable for its crimes in the Gaza Strip, and hold it responsible for what is happening in the Gaza Strip, and he returned the Turkish ambassador from Tel Aviv, in addition to Erdogan's speech in which he said that Netanyahu is over for him as a party to the dialogue, "he is written off for us," he said.[ix]Erdogan announced the cancellation of a visit to Israel before the war, saying Israel had "exploited Turkey's senseful intentions." Israel's Foreign Ministry attacked Erdogan following the return of the Turkish ambassador, accusing him of supporting the "terrorist organization Hamas".
Total
The war against Gaza has affected the course of Israeli relations between Russia and Turkey, which have been significantly strained during the war. Russia and Turkey have adopted similar positions on the war in accusing the United States and the West of responsibility for not stopping the war and legitimizing Israel's continued military operations without accounting for killing civilians and targeting institutions in the Gaza Strip. The two countries also share a view of Hamas as a political movement and not a terrorist movement as defined by the West, and Israel has criticized both countries for this. Posture.
On the other hand, the Israeli reaction to Turkey was more severe than its response to the Russian position, due to the sensitivity of the relationship with Russia, the link between Israeli security interests and Russia, and Russia's ability to annoy Israel in many files, including the Syrian file and the Iranian file. There is no doubt that Israeli relations with the two countries will enter the phase of tension, but it is necessary to differentiate between them, as with Russia Israel is not expected to change its relationship, even under US pressure after the war , as Israel needs Russia more than Russia needs it. On the other hand, the Israeli position will be different with Turkey, as it was Turkey that took the initiative two years ago to restore full diplomatic relations with Israel within the framework of the policy of "zeroing crises" with regional countries and exit of the regional crisis and the relative political isolation it has had in the Middle East.
Turkey has not announced the severance of ties with Israel and has tried to focus its accusation on Netanyahu mainly of leading a destructive war in the Gaza Strip because of his political stature, but Turkey hopes to maintain a minimum of its relationship with Israel to play a regional role during and after the war. It is clear that the Turkish and Russian positions are also directed against the policies of the US administration, as both sides have an open account with Washington. They want to put pressure on the United States and weaken its role in the region.
[i] Shai Har-Zvi, This is the time when the Government of Israel should strengthen its relationship with Turkey, Maariv, 30/5/2023
[ii] Itamar Eichner, Turkey Chose Continuity: These Are the Implications for Relations with Israel , Ynet, 29/5/2023
[iii] Danny Citrinovich, Deepening Economic and Security Relations between Russia and Iran, Institute for National Security Studies, 22/5/2023
[iv] Itamar Eichner, Israel-Russia Relations on the Saddami Track, Ynet, 1/11/2023
[v] Itamar Eichner, 60 detainees in Dagestan, terrifying testimony: they passed everyone on the bus, we miraculously survived, ynet, 30/10/2023
[vi] Arkady Mill-Min and Butt-hen Feldman, Russia-Hamas Relations in the Shadow of the Iron Sword War, Institute for National Security Studies, 8/11/2023
[vii] Itamar Eichner, Israel-Russia relations on a confrontational path, op. cit.
[viii] Maariv, Putin's great fear, why doesn't Russia want the war to expand?, Maariv, 23/10/2023
[ix] Haaretz, Turkey returned its ambassador from Israel, Erdogan, cut off communication with Netanyahu, is written off for us, Haaretz, 4/11/2023
