From the electronic series "Israeli Papers," issue 73 titled "The Israeli Left and the Peace Process: From Peace Now, to Peace Later, to No Peace at All."
This issue includes a translation by Bilal Daher of a recently released analytical study by the Molad Center for the Renewal of Democracy in Israel. The study, authored by Yonatan Levi, a Ph.D. candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science and a fellow researcher at Molad and the Pearl Katselson Fund, and Sh.Y. Agmon, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Oxford and a fellow researcher at Molad, aims to answer the question of how the Zionist left relinquished the political-security debate, paving the way for the rise of populism in Israel.
In the introduction to the translation, written by series editor Antoine Shalhat, the authors believe, in what can be considered their most significant conclusion, that a consistent mechanism has emerged in the Israeli political arena in the last decade. According to them, the right-wing camp determines the boundaries of policy, and the center-left camp follows suit. In their view, there is no valid reason to believe that the current trend will change in the future, as long as there is no political camp willing to stand against racial and nationalist drift, boldly declaring, "Thus far!" They attribute this mechanism to two significant shifts in the Israeli political landscape in the last two decades. Firstly, the retreat of the center-left from the political-security debate and the adoption of the right-wing vision, especially regarding the so-called "peace process." Secondly, the rise of populist neoliberal right-wing, seeking to dismantle democratic institutions in Israel and distinguishing between "true" Israelis - right-wing supporters, and "untrue" Israelis - left-wing supporters. Their main claim is that the success of populist right-wing in Israel is closely tied to the left's abandonment of the political-security battle.
Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian "peace process," the authors believe that it has transitioned through three political-security models, which they refer to as the "shifts of the left." Each of these models is based on a different analysis of the situation in the Middle East and relies on specific assumptions about what can and cannot be done to change the reality in the country. The first model is "Peace Now," reaching its peak with the election of Yitzhak Rabin as the Israeli Prime Minister in 1992 and ending with the outbreak of the Second Intifada in 2000. The second model is "Peace Later," solidifying significantly in 2003 when former Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon announced the plan to disengage from the Gaza Strip and some parts of the West Bank, ending with Benjamin Netanyahu's rise to power in 2009. The third model is "No Peace at All," beginning in 2009 and still dominating the Israeli political landscape to this day.
The authors also clarify that this surrender by the left not only led to its electoral collapse but also reshaped the boundaries of Israeli politics. These boundaries align with the foundational thoughts of the right-wing for decades: 1. Peace is unattainable; 2. There is no Palestinian partner for peace; 3. Settlements are necessary for Israel's security, and hence, the occupation [of the 1967 territories] is necessary; 4. Practical evacuation of settlements is impossible due to the increasing number of Israeli settlers in the West Bank; 5. Violence must be responded to with greater force; 6. A two-state solution is not the long-term political solution; rather, it is the "management of the conflict."
