In this paper, the concept of "conflict reduction" regarding the Palestinian issue is examined and analyzed. This concept was initially formulated by Israeli researcher Micah Goodman. The paper delves into the evolution of this concept, its later adoption by Israeli political discourse, particularly within the right-wing, and its endorsement by current Prime Minister Naftali Bennett in June 2021. Notably, it first appeared in the election program of the "New Hope" party led by Gideon Sa'ar, a former Likud member.
The reading of the paper, prepared and presented by researcher Walid Habbas, translated by Bilal Zaher, reveals that "conflict reduction" does not encompass the two-state solution or Israeli withdrawal from the 1967 territories. In other words, its aim is not to end the conflict but to ensure Israel's security by shifting from "conflict management to occupation management."
In the first section, the paper critiques the "conflict reduction" model by comparing it with other models adopted directly or indirectly by Israel, such as the "conflict resolution," "conflict management," "conflict resolution," and "economic peace." The remainder of the paper translates key articles to understand the internal Israeli debate on the concept.
The first translated article, written by Micah Goodman in 2019, titled "Eight Steps for Conflict Reduction," serves as the foundational piece that introduced the concept, later becoming a reference inspiring right-wing and centrist Israeli parties in their approach to the Palestinian issue. The second article, authored by former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, criticizes the "conflict reduction" concept, considering it a new twist in right-wing Israeli discourse. The third article sees Goodman responding to Barak's criticisms. The final article by Meirav Rabbaport provides a more radical critique of the concept, opposing Israeli occupation based on "security necessities."
It's worth noting that Goodman presents "conflict reduction" as a consensus solution between the Israeli "left" and Zionist right-wing, suggesting it aligns more with centrist Israeli parties. In other words, conflict reduction is viewed as an internal Israeli necessity to navigate the impasse between those opposing continued occupation (the left) and those insisting on a presence in the West Bank for security reasons (Zionist right), while considering the Palestinians' rights based on various international agreements and standards.
The paper concludes that for Naftali Bennett, "conflict reduction" may not necessarily address internal Israeli contradictions between the left and the Zionist right. Although the current government coalition includes left, center, right-wing, and Arab parties, making the model a hot topic, Bennett's perspective focuses more on its suitability for the Israeli-Palestinian relationship rather than the internal dynamics between the left and Zionist right. Bennett sees it as an exit strategy from the fundamental contradiction between Israel's settler nature and the peace process initiated in 1993, based on the two-state solution within the 1967 borders.
Additionally, the paper notes that "conflict reduction," emerging from within the framework of "conflict management," differs from the concept of economic peace. "Conflict reduction" does not aim to create close economic ties that might lead to real concessions by Palestinians during final status negotiations. Instead, it is based on the belief that the two-state solution is practically unworkable. The economic facilitations serve the purpose of reducing Palestinian discontent with ongoing occupation.
Furthermore, "conflict reduction" offers Palestinians concessions beyond the economic field but never reaches the political level. These concessions specifically involve removing or easing mechanisms that make Palestinians feel continuously under occupation, facing a constant struggle against an "enemy" controlling their movements, restricting travel, and even influencing their economy (imports, exports, and labor).
