This paper addresses the current situation in the Israeli-Syrian scene and the complex relationships that may arise with other parties, primarily Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia.
The paper begins with the premise that the current situation in the Syrian scene will require Israel to take actions that will decisively shape its political and field position regarding the Syrian crisis. This resolution may not occur through a single political or military strike, but rather through the transition from the stage of continuous pressure and intervention to the stage of decisive action. The form of this decisive action could involve international and regional political agreements that Israel may have to accept or influence in order to safeguard its interests. It could also involve a series of decisive military strikes, where Israel would have concluded the temporary and accumulated military phase and started preparing for comprehensive future confrontations.
Introduction
Russian-Israeli relations primarily focus on the Syrian and Iranian issues. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has visited Russia eight times since September 2015, and ongoing dozens of phone calls have taken place between him and Russian President Vladimir Putin during the same period. These moves and communications have largely centered around the Syrian conflict and Iran's presence in Syria.
In the initial visits, the focus of meetings between the two countries was to establish understandings between Russia and Israel regarding direct military intervention in the Syrian arena. Israel's objective in these meetings was to prevent any clashes between the Israeli Air Force and the Russian Air Force and to safeguard Israeli interests in the Syrian arena, particularly its security interests. This objective was indeed achieved, as Israel continued its attacks on Syrian and Iranian targets in Syria.
Since then, Netanyahu's meetings with Putin have been primarily focused on Israeli concerns over Iranian presence in Syria, especially in the border region near the Golan Heights, and Iran's efforts to enhance the capabilities of Hezbollah in Lebanon.
It is not an exaggeration to say that since its military intervention in Syria, through conducting attacks on military sites and weapons convoys, Israel has managed to establish an understanding and acceptance of its intervention without arousing widespread condemnation or warnings except from the Syrian regime, its supporters, and allies. This state of affairs, which has seen an increase in the quantity and quality of attacks, has been facilitated by Israel's occasional silence regarding its attacks, the limited response from the Syrian regime, and the U.S. support for Israel, considering these attacks as part of its right to self-defense. However, the most important factor in all of this has been the Israeli-Russian understandings regarding this issue after Israel's direct military intervention in Syria three years ago. These understandings have allowed Israel to carry out military attacks in Syria on the condition of coordination with the Russian side to avoid any significant friction between the two parties.
Israel has escalated its military attacks on Syria both in terms of quantity, with increased frequency, and in terms of quality. These attacks no longer target weapon convoys as they did at the beginning of the Syrian crisis. Instead, Israel has focused on striking military sites, particularly those where Iran is attempting to establish a military presence. Some of these sites are newly established Iranian positions, while others are Syrian sites used by Iran. Furthermore, the comfortable international and regional environment for Israel, following the rise of President Donald Trump to power, has reduced the need for Israel to conceal these attacks. As a result, Israel has become more open, explicit, and clear in its airstrikes.
However, these successive Israeli attacks have recently faced two challenges.
The first challenge was the downing of an Israeli aircraft during one of the attacks, to which Israel responded with what we previously described as a "one-day war" on Syria.
Since then, we have witnessed that Syria has been trying to intercept Israeli attacks without success, due to the weakness of its air defenses compared to the advancement of the Israeli Air Force. This has not prevented Israel from continuing its attacks without hindrance. However, what is noteworthy is that Israeli attacks have become more cautious than before. Israeli aircraft now launch their missiles at the targeted sites from outside Syrian borders, sometimes from Lebanese airspace and other times from above the Mediterranean Sea. It is undeniable that the military escalation that followed did not affect the Russian-Israeli understandings in any way.
As for the second, more significant and dangerous challenge, it was the downing of the Russian military reconnaissance plane by Syrian air defenses about two weeks ago. This incident angered Russia, particularly its military establishment, which directly accused Israel of downing the plane, claiming it used it as a shield during the attacks. Israel denied these accusations, stating that the Israeli aircraft conducting the attack were within Israeli airspace at the time of the incident.
So far, Russia has responded to Israel with two steps:
The first step was to close the airspace surrounding Syria and Lebanon from the Mediterranean Sea for a period of two weeks. This move aims to prevent Israeli aircraft from carrying out military operations in Syria during this period.
The second step was the delivery of the advanced Russian S-300 air defense system to Syria, with the aim of enhancing its defensive capabilities against Israeli attacks. It is evident that this system, expected to arrive in Syria within two weeks, will be under Russian supervision and serves as a threat to Israel, aiming to control its movements.
It is worth noting that for over five years, Russia has been threatening to sell the S-300 anti-aircraft system to Syria. However, it has repeatedly backed down at the request of the Israeli government and sometimes the US administration. This long-range system, with a range of 250 kilometers, is more advanced than the currently used S-200 air defense system in Syria. According to Russian media reports, the system will be deployed on the western coast of Syria and in the southwest of the country, near the Israeli and Jordanian borders. These two regions are likely to be the areas from which the Israeli Air Force conducts its airstrikes.
Israel hopes that this crisis will be resolved so that it can resume its airstrikes in Syria, as it has done in previous years. Netanyahu has repeatedly emphasized that Israel is determined to continue targeting Iranian presence in Syria, stating that this crisis will not deter them from ongoing attacks there.
Netanyahu had stated, before his departure to the United Nations General Assembly in New York last week, that he had agreed with Putin for the Israeli and Russian military teams to meet soon to continue coordination. Israeli estimates indicated that the crisis with Russia and the situation in Syria would be at the top of Netanyahu's agenda in his talks with President Donald Trump. Military analyst Amos Harel wrote in the "Haaretz" newspaper that Israel is convinced of the sincerity of the investigation conducted by the Air Force and the possibility of convincing the Americans of the army's claims regarding the events related to the downing of the Russian plane. However, Russia, especially its military establishment, still holds Israel responsible for the plane's downing, despite Israeli Air Force Commander Major General Amikam Norkin's visit to Russia and the presentation of a report prepared by Israel confirming the Israeli version. It is noteworthy that the statement of the Russian Ministry of Defense was more severe after this meeting between the two parties, and it is still unclear whether there is coordination between Putin and the military establishment in their differing statements, or if the military establishment's position differs from Putin's, especially regarding the downing of the plane.
However, among the overall Russian responses, including the anti-Israeli attack in the media, it can be noted that there is a Russian intention to exploit the incident and maximize the crisis in order to later advance Russian goals in the region.
This is confirmed by an assessment issued by the "National Security Studies Institute" at Tel Aviv University. According to this assessment, it should be taken into consideration that there are factions within the Russian administration that are not in favor of the freedom of action granted by Russia to Israel to act against Iranian presence, and they will exploit this incident to undermine Russian-Israeli relations and Israel's freedom of action in Syria. It is likely that this was strongly expressed in the criticism directed at Israel in the Russian media.
The possible scenarios from the Israeli perspective:
After the recent crisis with Russia, there are several possible scenarios regarding Israeli intervention in Syria and the overall Israeli relationship with the actors involved in this country.
The first scenario: Overcoming the current crisis through a new agreement
This scenario is based on the assumption that the current crisis was a result of a coordination system error between Israel and Russia. In this scenario, Israel takes responsibility for the incident, leading to the drafting of a new agreement that restricts Israel's freedom of action in Syria, but does not completely nullify it. The new agreement maintains Israel's right to attack Iranian sites and weapon convoys, just as it was in the old agreement. However, the scope and frequency of these actions would be reduced compared to the previous agreement. Additionally, the process of alerting about Israeli military operations in Syria would be longer, which poses greater risks for Israel. Nevertheless, this scenario is preferable to completely canceling the agreement with Russia, which would prevent Israel from conducting attacks inside Syria.
Russia may accept this scenario because it sees Israel's agreement to the continuity of Bashar al-Assad's regime as an important role in stabilizing his government. Moreover, the differences between Israeli and Russian interests regarding Iranian presence in Syria may not be significant and primarily revolve around differing approaches to prevent this presence. In this case, the new Syrian defenses would target Israeli aircraft if Israel violates the terms of the new agreement. This means that Russia would use these defenses to punish Israel for any breach, utilizing Syria to do so.
The second scenario: Maintaining the old agreement and overcoming the crisis
This scenario is based on the understanding that the old agreement is a good one, and it has been successful all these years in preventing friction between the two parties and enhancing their interests in Syria without conflicting with each other. While what happened was merely a technical malfunction unrelated to the effectiveness of the agreement and coordination. In this scenario, Russia acknowledges that the downing of the plane was the result of a series of errors, as stated by Russian President Vladimir Putin when he described the incident. Thus, this crisis will come to an end, and in this case, Israel will target Iranian presence in Syria in a manner that aligns with the interests of both parties. In the context of this scenario, the newly delivered air defenses to Syria will have no significance, as their use will be determined by Russia in emergency cases. The possibility of this scenario is supported by the statement of the Israeli Security Cabinet, where the ministers expressed "regret" for the killing of Russian servicemen on the downed plane, but the statement held the Syrian army responsible and reiterated that the army would continue its operations against Iranian military presence in Syria through coordination with Russia. The continuation of this scenario is also indicated by the mild tone used by Putin regarding the downing of the Russian plane.
The third Scenario three: Escalation of tensions between Russia and Israel to the point of canceling the agreement
This scenario is based on the assumption that the incident of the Russian plane crash rendered the agreement between the two countries practically nonexistent. Consequently, the relationship between the parties would be characterized by caution and pursued based on each party's interests. The use of the new defense systems would only occur if Israeli attacks threatened Russian interests, such as the preservation of the Syrian regime or the safety of Russian soldiers in Syria. This scenario would revert Israel's behavior to the pre-coordination agreement era, allowing Israel to carry out its attacks within its declared red lines while avoiding direct confrontation with Syrian forces or the regime, thus preventing Russia from using its defense systems against these attacks.
This scenario carries significant risks for Israeli interests, as the absence of coordination may lead to clashes between the parties. Additionally, it grants the Syrian regime greater freedom to use modern defense systems against Israeli aircraft. The harsh tone used by the Russian Ministry of Defense towards Israel, directly holding it responsible for the plane crash without mentioning the Syrian party's responsibility, reinforces this scenario.
According to the latest Israeli assessments, the bigger picture indicates that the depth of Israeli-Russian interests will allow both parties to overcome the incident. It is not reasonable for Russia, at present, to jeopardize the vital and mutually beneficial relations it maintains with Israel. Therefore, it is expected that the crisis will be resolved in the coming days through understandings reached between the leaders of the two countries, who have a relationship built on trust. However, there is a possibility of imposing certain restrictions on Israel's freedom of action in Syria. It appears that Russia will request Israel to refrain from conducting operations in areas where their forces are deployed, and at the very least, provide Russian forces with a longer advance warning. As is customary, Russia will seek to leverage the incident to advance its other interests.
These assessments confirm that an incident of this nature was expected sooner or later due to the intensive operations carried out by the Israeli Air Force against Iranian presence in Syria and the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah. However, they also emphasize that the reasons that led Israel to adopt this strategy are still valid, and Israel will seek to continue its policy. The Air Force, which will undoubtedly conduct a thorough investigation into the incident, will have to draw lessons and tighten the conditions for operations in areas where Russian forces are deployed and active, taking into account the increased presence of Russian air operations, even if they are not actually close to the flight paths of those aircraft. It is reasonable to expect a reduction in Israeli Air Force operations in Syria, at least in the near future, and they will be subject to greater political scrutiny. It is also possible to exploit the incident to clarify to the Russian side that the transfer of more advanced air defense systems to the Syrians will increase the danger to their forces as well, as the incident confirms the poor performance of the Syrian air defense. Furthermore, this is another opportunity to demonstrate to the Russians that the presence of Iran and its affiliated militias creates an explosive situation in Syria that is more susceptible to such incidents.
