The purpose of this paper is to analyze the Israeli position on recent events related to the Gaza Strip, particularly the frequency of talks about reaching a settlement with Hamas regarding the future of the Strip.
The paper starts from the premise that the current Israeli position on recent events, whether in terms of rhetoric or behavior (political, military, and diplomatic), remains linked to the Israeli strategic orientation of separating the Gaza Strip from the West Bank, so that this objective has become the central axis of Israeli strategy, while the identity of those who govern Gaza has receded into a peripheral axis, as long as Israel is able to ensure and achieve its central objective regarding the Gaza Strip.
It is worth noting, in this regard, that this Israeli perspective on the Gaza Strip faces challenges such as the position of the Palestinian Authority, the position of Hamas itself, the Egyptian position, and the international position.
This paper discusses the most prominent of these issues, but only in light of the recent events in the Gaza Strip.
Introduction
Israel dealt with the Gaza Strip, following the separation between Gaza and the West Bank due to the division in 2007, initially as a security issue, especially after the unilateral disengagement led by Ariel Sharon in 2005. The perspective later evolved to consider Gaza as a political matter as well. The Sharonian plan of disengagement aimed to politically and security-wise neutralize the Gaza Strip from the permanent solution issues. Many analysts do not rule out the possibility that Sharon himself intended, through his plan, to separate Gaza from the West Bank as part of his vision for a solution, which remained incomplete due to his illness and removal from power. Subsequently, after a series of wars that followed the Israeli disengagement in 2005 and the Palestinian division in 2007, and with the rise of the Israeli right to power in 2009, the right-wing started seeing the Palestinian division as a "political opportunity" to strengthen its vision for a solution or non-solution. On one hand, Israel struggles with the authority as it does not represent all Palestinians due to its lack of control over the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, it rejects any Palestinian reconciliation that would lead to the unity of the authority between the Strip and the West Bank, using the pretext that Hamas is a terrorist movement. Therefore, the two wars that the right-wing waged on the Gaza Strip while it was under the authority's rule (in 2012 and 2014) were not aimed at overthrowing Hamas's rule in the Strip, but rather to maintain the existing situation drawn by Israel in accordance with its interests, and this can be summarized in three points:
First: Cementing the Palestinian division between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
Second: Preserving security calm amid the division, particularly from Gaza.
Third: Maintaining the blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip while keeping the division and security calm intact.
Current Events and Settlement Options
The current events began in the aftermath of the "Great March of Return" launched by active youth, political, and national sectors in the Gaza Strip. Its main objective was to lift the blockade on the Gaza Strip, as the issue of the blockade receded on the Arab and international levels, especially after years of relative military and security calm between Israel and Hamas following the last war on Gaza in 2014 (Operation "Protective Edge"). The marches, in a way, contributed to bringing the issue of the Gaza Strip back to the Arab, international, and Israeli agendas. Israel dealt with the "Great March of Return" as part of Hamas' aggressive actions against Israel, and these marches were consistently demonized, considering their goal as "border infiltration" and "committing massacres against Jews residing in the vicinity of the Strip!" The marches coincided with the inauguration of the US Embassy in Jerusalem, so the protests carried a political message that went beyond lifting the blockade on the Gaza Strip. However, the Israeli narrative of the marches, along with the subsequent launch of incendiary balloons towards settlements adjacent to the Strip, remained unchanged, as these marches were initiated, supported, and organized by Hamas, for the following reasons:
First: Hamas is experiencing difficult political, economic, and international circumstances, especially after its isolation in the Arab world and the Egyptian blockade. Therefore, it resorted to the "Great March of Return" to break its isolation and blockade.
Second: Due to this isolation and the Israeli and Arab blockade, Hamas is unable to use military force against Israel. The consequences of the 2014 war on Gaza are still fresh in their minds. Additionally, Israel would have more freedom to kill and destroy in a future war with Gaza, as the world is preoccupied with other issues. Thus, the "terrorist Great March of Return" was adopted as a means to confront Israel without incurring a significant military cost, as in the case of direct military confrontation.
Third: The escalation of hostilities between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority, and the absence of a reconciliation horizon between the two parties, along with the steps taken by the Authority towards Gaza on the economic front. Hamas has started searching for a new political horizon to break its isolation and lift the blockade.
Since the launch of the "Great March of Return" on March 30, 2018, there have been sporadic indirect military confrontations that last for one day each time. During these confrontations, the resistance launches dozens of rockets towards Israel in response to Israel's shelling of the Gaza Strip. The objective behind this is to maintain the understandings reached during the last war on Gaza and prevent Israel from easily targeting Gaza through airstrikes and killing resistance fighters.
Settlement in Gaza
There is an unclear debate in Israel regarding the issue of settlement in the Gaza Strip. It is important to mention that the Israeli discourse refers to the agreement being discussed as "Hisdara," which is a vague term in this context. However, the Israeli government is trying to promote this term through media channels, as it implies that what is happening in the sector is the arrangement of security, economic, and political issues rather than an agreement with Hamas. This is part of Netanyahu's attempt to market the settlement with Hamas, contrary to the general sentiment of the Israeli public, which calls for a military campaign, liquidations, and tightening the noose on Palestinians in Gaza.
According to a public opinion poll conducted on the Israeli public's stance on the settlement in the Gaza Strip, it was indicated that 40% oppose this agreement, while 27% support it. This is roughly the same position for Likud supporters (41% opposed and 28% in favor).
In general, there is ambiguity in Israeli statements regarding the settlement with Gaza after the recent confrontation, during which the resistance launched over a hundred rockets towards Israel following the army's killing of Palestinians from the Al-Qassam Brigades. Initially, Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman, the leader of the "Yisrael Beiteinu" party, led the discourse on the settlement, speaking about an agreement based on a complete ceasefire in exchange for rapid economic facilitations. However, Lieberman faced strong criticism from the Minister of Education and the leader of the "Jewish Home" party, Naftali Bennett, who attacked Lieberman, saying, "Those who succumb to Hamas blackmail will bring war upon us."
In addition to the strong criticism directed at this agreement, especially because it does not include the return of the bodies of two Israeli soldiers and Israeli civilians held in Gaza, Israel appears to be taking a submissive position to Hamas dictates. This is particularly evident among right-wing factions of the political map. Lieberman has backtracked on promoting the agreement, claiming that he has no knowledge of any settlement on the matter.
This is despite international sources confirming that Israel and Hamas have reached an agreement not to engage in a new war between them.
However, there has not yet been an official Israeli statement regarding a settlement in Gaza, and it is possible that Netanyahu wants to keep it secret for now. He has not involved the Security Cabinet in these details. Additionally, there is strong criticism of this settlement based on the belief that any agreement with Hamas will not last long, and that war is inevitable. This sentiment was expressed by Amos Yadlin, the former head of Military Intelligence and director of the Institute for National Security Studies.
Yadlin wrote: "There are two scenarios, the first of which is currently unattainable and represents a long-term agreement or a 'comprehensive settlement.' This would entail a long-term ceasefire agreement that includes lifting the blockade on Gaza, economic and infrastructural reconstruction, investment, the return of the Palestinian Authority to the Gaza Strip, prisoner exchange, preventing the military arm of Hamas from strengthening, and disarmament in Gaza. This situation is not possible in the current context due to three obstacles: Hamas will not abandon its military arm, the Palestinian Authority refuses to be a party to the agreement, and Hamas' demands regarding the return of the soldiers' bodies and the detained citizens are illogical."
Yadlin continues regarding the second scenario or option, saying: "On the other hand, there is a comprehensive military campaign (war). Here we are talking about a major confrontation. In the midst of that, Hamas will launch long-range rockets to the best of its ability, use rocket launchers with heavier warheads, attempt to infiltrate Israel through tunnels or the sea, and use unmanned aerial vehicles. In response, Israel will employ its air force against hundreds of Hamas targets, resume targeted assassinations, and conduct ground incursions on a scale not seen since Operation Protective Edge (2014)."
Yadlin indicates that both parties are not interested in a comprehensive confrontation, each for their own reasons. Therefore, according to his opinion, the settlement that Israel seeks must encompass four objectives, which are goals within the broader strategy that should be employed in dealing with the Gaza Strip.
The four objectives, according to Yadlin, are as follows:
First: Restoring calm and security to the adjacent area of the Gaza Strip and restoring Israeli deterrence capability.
Second: Separating the Gaza Strip from Israeli responsibility by either reintroducing the Palestinian Authority there or shifting responsibility to Egypt.
Third: Rehabilitating the Gaza Strip and preventing a humanitarian crisis.
Fourth: Disarming the Gaza Strip, or at least preventing the reinforcement of resistance movements there.
On his part, military analyst Ron Ben-Yishai points out that the settlement in the Gaza Strip came from the security apparatus (the army, the Shin Bet, and the National Security Council) and was adopted by Netanyahu and Lieberman. The idea of the settlement arises from the goal of preventing a war in the region, in order to focus on the northern front and the absence of a political horizon after the war. Ben-Yishai highlights the advantages of the settlement as presented in the Ministerial Security Cabinet, as follows:
Firstly, the settlement will lead to imposing calm in the south without human or military losses, and without attempts to capture soldiers that may succeed, as well as without spending billions of shekels.
Secondly, the settlement will enable the completion of the construction of the barrier on the border of the Strip, and it will provide an opportunity to focus on countering the Iranian presence in Syria.
Thirdly, the settlement will grant Israel international legitimacy for a broad military operation in Gaza if the settlement fails.
Fourthly, the success of the settlement will prevent a humanitarian crisis in the Strip, which Israel would be blamed for, and it will reduce the motivation of youth to engage in military actions against Israel.
Fifthly, the settlement will strengthen Hamas' rule, but this reality is better for Israel than a state of chaos that could prevail in Gaza in the absence of Hamas. Furthermore, it will enhance the division and animosity between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.
Israel is moving towards reaching a settlement with Hamas in the Gaza Strip. However, Israel is still vague about presenting the details of this settlement and is currently marketing it as a ceasefire agreement in exchange for economic privileges in the sector. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Israel's strategy towards the Strip has become clearer than before, which is to maintain Palestinian division and separate Gaza from the West Bank. It is evident that the Israeli government, in dealing with the Gaza Strip, listens to the strategic apparatuses in Israel, which propose solutions and tools to deal with the sector, contrary to the social base of the ruling Israeli right-wing that calls for a comprehensive military operation in the Strip with the aim of toppling Hamas. It is not a coincidence that even Lieberman and Netanyahu themselves have backed down from their previous positions regarding the necessity of overthrowing Hamas' rule in Gaza or occupying the Strip through a major ground operation. This is in line with the comprehensive Israeli strategy towards dealing with the Gaza Strip, which includes the political dimension (strengthening Palestinian division) and the security dimension (maintaining security calm and preventing the reinforcement of Hamas' power).
